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The Review Process in Economics:  
Is it Too Fast? 
 
Abstract 
Rewards for publications in good economics journals are very high, while submission fees and 
other monetary costs associated with submitting an existing manuscript are low. Consequently, 
the editorial delay (especially the first response time – the time until the first editorial decision), 
by postponing monetary rewards to publication, constitutes the major submission cost (from the 
author’s perspective). Reducing the delay will induce many additional submissions of low-
quality papers to good journals, increasing significantly the workload of editors and referees. 
Moreover, the rejection rate will increase and cause papers to be rejected more times prior to 
publication, offsetting at least some of the shorter first response times. As a result, the efforts of 
many editors to reduce the editorial delay, while attracting more submissions to their journals, 
may have adverse effects from a social perspective, and the optimal delay might be longer than 
the current average of four months. 2 
1. Introduction   
  The academic publishing process, and more generally what may be called “the 
production process of academic research,” is an extremely important topic that receives 
relatively little attention in the academic literature. Ellison (2002a) cites Lucas (1988), who said 
of economic growth “the consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are 
simply staggering: Once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else.” 
Ellison then adds, “Journal review processes have a large effect on how much progress growth 
economists make. They also affect the productivity of all other social and natural scientists. One 
could thus argue that they are an even more important research topic.”  
  The long time it takes an article from its first submission to a journal to its publication is 
one of the main criticisms of the academic review process in certain disciplines.
1 Especially 
upset about this long delay are untenured faculty, who need to publish several articles in a few 
years in order to get tenure. The first response time (the time from submission of the manuscript 
to receipt of the initial editorial decision about it; henceforth denoted FRT, or FRTs in plural) is a 
particularly important part of the delay; as opposed to the time it takes to revise the paper or the 
time from acceptance to publication, the FRT delays all manuscripts submitted, not only the few 
that are asked to revise and resubmit or the few that are accepted. Consequently, the average 
paper is delayed by the FRT several times (about 3-6 times according to Azar, 2004). 
  The long FRT in economics journals (often 3−6 months) seems unnecessary. After all, 
referees usually do not need more than a few hours to read a paper and write a report on it; 
                                                 
1 Natural sciences generally have faster review processes than the social sciences; economics is one of the slowest 
disciplines (see Ellison, 2002b). 3 
neither do editors need much time to make a decision once they obtain the referees’ reports. The 
short FRTs in leading journals in finance and accounting (often 1−2 months) suggest that shorter 
FRTs are possible. Indeed, editors of many economics journals try to reduce the FRT in their 
journals. Their motivation may be either altruistic, to benefit the profession, or less altruistic – to 
attract more submissions and increase the quality of the journal. Whatever the editors’ 
motivation is, most people believe that these efforts are welfare increasing. The article suggests 
that this common belief is not necessarily correct.  
  The article makes several main points: first, it stresses the importance of research about 
the academic publishing process and the profession in general as a tool to making more informed 
decisions. Research about the review process, for example, may allow us to make better 
decisions in issues such as the publication delay, submission fees, and single- versus double-
blind review. While some studies on the process of academic research were written and even 
published in top journals
2, the research in this area is scant compared to its importance.  
  Second, the article argues that the current FRT may be below optimal, so that efforts to 
reduce it may be counter-productive, even though I claim that reducing the FRT will not harm 
the quality of the review process. The reason that reducing the FRT may be harmful is that it will 
increase the number of submissions of low-quality papers to top journals, therefore increasing 
the workload of referees and editors without any significant benefit in terms of the quality of 
research published. Moreover, the increased number of submissions will raise the rejection rate 
and each paper will be rejected more times on average before it is published, so the total time 
from initial submission to publication may not decrease at all. Finally, I claim that even the ones 
                                                 
2 See for example Laband, 1990; Blank, 1991; Hamermesh, 1994; Laband and Piette, 1994; Engers and Gans, 1998; 
Moore, Newman and Turnbull, 2001; Ellison, 2002a; 2002b; Hamermesh and Oster, 2002. 4 
who seem to be the most interested in reducing the editorial delay, namely untenured faculty, 
may not benefit from such reduction.  
2.  Are the Efforts to Reduce the First Response Time Beneficial?   
  The aspect of the review process that receives maybe the most criticism is the long FRT.
3 
Authors, especially untenured ones, are upset that it takes several months to get a decision about 
the submitted manuscript. After all, the refereeing task only takes a few hours. Hamermesh 
(1994), for example, suggests that it takes six hours to referee an average paper. The Canadian 
Journal of Economics provides advice to referees in which it states “The amount of time taken 
with a paper can vary enormously – anything from a couple of hours to a couple of days of full-
time effort. A typical report should probably take 3 or 4 hours.”
4  
  If it takes only a few hours to referee a paper, why does it take several months to get a 
decision? While it takes editors time to choose referees and to reach a decision based on the 
referees’ reports, and mail to and from referees takes time, the main reason seems to be that it 
takes the referees a long time to return their reports. This long time is usually not because the 
referees need a lot of time to ponder about the paper, but because papers wait a long time to be 
read. In Franklin Fisher’s words, “Such a paper is delayed not because a referee is taking three 
months to decide on it but because it is sitting in a pile on his or her desk” (Shepherd, 1995, p. 
103). This may be the result of the referee having higher-priority tasks, of procrastination, and 
                                                 
3 In what follows, I sometimes use “editorial delay” or just “delay” rather than “FRT,” but they all mean the same 
thing. 
4 See on-line at http://economics.ca/cje/en/referees.php. 5 
maybe of fear that prompt response will result in additional refereeing assignments too soon (see 
Thomson, 2001, p. 116).  
  The delay caused by the refereeing process makes the dissemination of research slower, 
and this is particularly important because new research builds on previous one, so any delay 
causes the entire chain of research to be delayed. Moreover, when it takes a long time from 
writing an article to its publication, this reduces the chances that a policy-oriented article will be 
published in time to be relevant, deterring economists from writing such papers (see Borts, 
1981). These costs of the delay brought several economists to suggest ways to reduce the delay 
(see Hamermesh, 1994; Pressman, 1994; Szenberg 1994). Editors often express their desire to 
shorten the review time (see Ellison, 2002a).
5 Their reason, however, is often to attract authors 
rather than the profession’s welfare (see Stulz, 2000).  
  Are the efforts made by editors and others to shorten the FRT beneficial from a social 
point of view? Most scholars think that the answer is positive, as this enables faster 
dissemination of knowledge. The few who think that making the delay shorter is not necessarily 
beneficial usually argue that shortening the delay will reduce the quality of the review. This 
argument, however, is hard to settle with the fact that most of the delay is caused when the 
manuscript just waits to be read.  
  A more substantiated argument about positive relationship between the review quality 
and the time it takes is provided by Hamermesh (1994). He presents evidence that heavily-cited 
economists need three more weeks to referee papers compared to the average referee and three 
and half more weeks compared to the least-cited referees. In addition, Hamermesh assumes that 
heavily-cited economists give better feedback than their less-cited colleagues. This assumption is 
                                                 
5 See also the editors’ message of the Review of Economic Studies at http://www.restud.com/report.htm. 6 
an interesting topic for empirical research, because leading economists are probably busier and 
may put less time in writing the report, possibly leading to less helpful feedback. Given his 
assumption, however, Hamermesh calls the additional delay (the extra three weeks of using 
heavily-cited referees) “the implicit price of quality in the market for referees’ services.” Yet, 
even if heavily-cited referees do provide better feedback, this does not mean that shortening the 
delay requires the use of less-qualified referees. After all, even heavily-cited referees may be 
able to reduce the time papers spend in the pile waiting to be read. Indeed, Hamermesh also does 
not see the current delay as a necessary cost of quality refereeing process, but rather suggests a 
few ways to reduce the review time.  
  Even though I claim that shortening the delay need not reduce the quality of the review 
process, I argue that a shorter delay is not necessarily better. The reason is rooted in the special 
structure of costs and benefits in the academic profession. Basically, the idea is that the private 
cost to submit an existing manuscript to another journal is negligible compared to the private 
benefits from a publication in a good journal. This cost is also much smaller than the social cost 
of the review process. As a result, authors have an incentive to submit their manuscript to many 
more journals than a social planner would like them to. Authors do not internalize the costs that 
they impose on editors and referees when they submit a paper. The FRT is an additional 
submission cost from the author’s perspective, and it therefore increases the private costs of 
submission, reducing the number of submissions and alleviating the workload on editors and 
referees. As a result, given the current submission fees, shortening the editorial delay without 
taking measures to prevent excessive submissions may in fact reduce social welfare.
6 In the 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of several potential measures to reduce the FRT while preventing frivolous submissions, see Azar 
(2005).  7 
following sections I elaborate on these points, using empirical evidence about the costs and 
benefits of submitting manuscripts to journals.     
3.  Why Does a Lower First Response Time Lead to More Submissions? 
  To show why a lower FRT leads to more submissions, I present a simple model about 
how the optimal submission strategy is determined. The optimal submission strategy is a very 
complicated problem to solve analytically, so to make the model traceable I use almost the 
simplest framework possible, and ignore interesting issues such as the differences in FRTs 
between journals (for a discussion and empirical analysis of the optimal submission strategy see 
Oster, 1980).  
  Assume that for a certain manuscript, there is a finite set of journals that may publish it, 
and that they can be ranked according to their quality, where quality is determined according to 
the gains of an author from having a publication in the journal. Denote the number of relevant 
journals by K, and let 1 be the highest-quality journal, 2 the second highest and so on. Let Gi be 
the present value of the gains from having a paper accepted by journal i (the i-th best journal), 
for example increased salary (the gains from publications are discussed in detail in the following 
sections). By definition, G1 ≥ G2 ≥ … ≥ GK.  
The author can rank the quality of his paper, where quality J means that the paper will 
surely be accepted by journals J, J+1, … , K. Clearly, the author will never submit the paper to 
the journals J+1, J+2, …, K, since he is better off submitting to journal J, and the paper is then 
accepted for sure. There is also a positive (but smaller than 1) probability that the paper will be 
accepted in journals better than J; the probability of acceptance of a quality-J paper in journal i is 
denoted by qi(J). By definition, qi(J) = 1 for all i ≥ J.  8 
For simplicity I assume that G1q1(J) ≥ G2q2(J) ≥ … ≥ GJ−1qJ−1(J). It may be, however, that 
GJqJ(J) (which is equal to GJ) is higher than GJ−1qJ−1(J), and even higher than G1q1(J). I also 
assume that each submission has a cost of c < GK. Let us define δ = 1 / (1 + interest rate)
d, where 
d is the FRT. Assuming that the author submits the manuscript to the next journal immediately 
after receiving a rejection, the time between subsequent submissions of the manuscript is equal 
to d. It follows that δ is the discount factor according to which the author discounts the payoff 
from the next submission.   
Since both Gi and Giqi are non-increasing in i for all i < J, the author’s optimal strategy is 
to submit the paper first to the best m journals in a decreasing order (0 ≤ m ≤ J−1), and then to 
journal J. This strategy has the obvious stopping rule: once the paper is accepted at a certain 
journal, the author does not submit it anymore. To find the optimal value of m, the author first 
considers two options: (A) Submit the manuscript immediately to journal J; (B) Submit the 
manuscript first to journal 1 and if rejected to J. If the utility from (A) exceeds that from (B), the 
optimal action is to submit the manuscript to J. On the other hand, if the utility from (B) exceeds 
that from (A), it is better to submit the manuscript first to 1 (but not necessarily to then submit to 
J if it is rejected). The utility from (A) is GJ − c, while the utility from (B) is −c + q1(J)G1 + (1 − 
q1(J))δ(GJ − c), so it is optimal to submit immediately to J (to choose m = 0) if and only if GJ ≥ 
q1(J)G1 + (1 − q1(J))δ(GJ − c).  
Similarly, if the author submits to journal 1 and receives a rejection, he compares the 
utility from submitting to J immediately and submitting first to 2 and if rejected to J. Submitting 
to J at this point (i.e. choosing m = 1) is optimal if and only if GJ ≥ q2(J)G2 + (1 − q2(J))δ(GJ − c). 
We can analyze the optimal decision at any point in a similar fashion. The result is that the 
author submits to journal i rather than to J as long as  9 
( 1 )       q i(J)Gi + (1 − qi(J))δ(GJ − c) > GJ,  
and once this inequality is violated for a certain journal i, he submits the paper to J.
7  
  Given the value of GJ, if the value of qi(J)Gi + (1 − qi(J))δ(GJ − c) is increased for all i, 
the number of journals that the author tries before submitting to J (which we defined as m) is also 
(weakly) increased. One way to increase the value of qi(J)Gi + (1 − qi(J))δ(GJ − c) for all i is to 
reduce c. This implies that if the submission cost is reduced, the author chooses to submit his 
paper to more top journals before submitting it to the journal where it is accepted for sure. The 
same idea applies to the FRT, which can be thought of as the time cost of submission. Since 
qi(J)Gi + (1 − qi(J))δ(GJ − c) is increasing in δ, it is decreasing in d. It follows that a shorter FRT 
(lower d) causes m
* (the optimal value of m) to be higher.  
  In addition, the average number of submissions is increasing in m. To see this, notice that 
the expected number of submissions is equal to n(m) = q1 + 2(1 − q1)q2 + 3(1 − q1)(1 − q2)q3 + 
… + [m + 1](1 − q1)(1 − q2)…(1 − qm)       (using qi rather than qi(J) to simplify the notation). It 
is immediate that n(m) is increasing in m, and therefore n(m
*(d)) is decreasing in d, implying that 
lower FRTs increase the number of submissions. 
                                                 
7 If the inequality (1) is satisfied for journal z and is violated for journal z+1, it is also satisfied for journals 1, 2, …, 
z−1, and is also violated for z+1, z+2, …, J−1. This follows from the fact that qi(J)Gi + (1 − q i(J))δ(GJ − c) is 
decreasing in i for all i < J. To see this, consider two journals x and y, where x < y < J. We want to show that qx(J)Gx 
+ (1 − qx(J))δ(GJ − c) ≥ qy(J)Gy + (1 − qy(J))δ(GJ − c). If qx(J) ≤ qy(J), this follow immediately (recall that c < GK < 
GJ and qx(J)Gx ≥ qy(J)Gy). If qx(J) ≥ qy(J), notice that qx(J)Gx + (1 − qx(J))δ(GJ − c) ≥ qx(J)Gy + (1 − qx(J))δ(GJ − c) ≥ 
qy(J)Gy + (1 − qy(J))δ(GJ − c), where the first inequality follows from Gx ≥ Gy and the second inequality follows 
from qx(J) ≥ qy(J) and Gy ≥ GJ > δ(GJ − c). 10 
  The fact that the number of submissions is decreasing in the FRT suggests that there is a 
cost to shortening the FRT, namely the opportunity cost of the time of referees and editors. It 
does not imply necessarily that short FRT is not beneficial. The optimal FRT depends on the 
magnitude of the social benefit from early publication and the social cost of the refereeing 
process, taking into account which manuscripts will be submitted under different FRTs. The next 
section presents some evidence about the costs and benefits of submissions that helps to evaluate 
whether the current FRT is optimal. 
4.  Costs and Benefits of Submissions 
4.1  Private Benefits From a Publication 
What are the returns to publication? The returns in form of satisfaction, pride, social 
status and the like are important without doubt, but I have no way to evaluate their monetary 
value. I will therefore consider only the monetary rewards to publication. This implies that in 
practice authors are more willing to submit their papers to top journals than the analysis here 
suggests. On the other hand, when considering the costs of submission, I do not include the 
psychological disutility from getting a rejection. Again, this is not because I think that this cost is 
not important, but because I have no way to estimate its magnitude. Ignoring this cost implies 
that the author is less willing to submit his work to top journals than is suggested by the analysis. 
The two biases, however, are in opposite directions; if they are roughly at the same magnitude, 
the analysis below is not too biased. The analysis thus follows most of the economic literature by 
ignoring psychological costs and benefits and focusing on monetary gains and costs.  
In addition, since I present all the steps in the analysis, the interested reader can perform 
similar computations adding what he thinks are the psychological benefit from a publication in a 11 
top journal and the psychological cost of receiving a rejection. Using reasonable values, I do not 
think that the main results of the analysis change significantly. An interesting idea for future 
research, however, is to interview professors at different stages of their career about their 
monetary evaluation of the psychological disutility from receiving rejection letters or the 
psychological utility from having a publication in various journals.  
What are the monetary returns from publications? Moore, Newman and Turnbull (2001) 
examined how salaries of US economics professors are affected by publications and other 
variables. They estimated that a publication in the top 10 journals in economics (level 1) 
accounts for a 2.9 percent increase in salary, a publication in level-2 journals (ranked about 11 – 
55) increases salary by 1.7 percent, and other publications increase salary by 0.1 percent. The 
true contribution to salary is slightly higher, however, because of the additional effect of citations 
on salary.
8  
Sauer (1988) obtains similar results; his numbers already include the effect of citations on 
salary. According to his study, publication in the top journal is worth an increase of 3.8 percent 




th are worth 61.6, 53.1, 
34.1, and 18.9 percent of the value of publication in the top journal. Combining the results of the 
                                                 
8 Each career citation adds 0.1% to salary, but the product [citations * total articles] has a negative effect on salary. 
Taking the sample averages and assuming (in the absence of better information) that level 1 and 2 articles generate 
citations by the same rate, and that publications in other journals do not generate citations, I find that citations 
increase the effect of a level-1 or level-2 publication by 0.1% (of salary) for a full professor and 0.3% for an 
associate professor.  12 
two studies, and defining level 3 to be journals ranked 56-100, publications in level 1, 2 and 3 
result in about 3, 1.7, and 0.7 percent increase in salary (including citation effect).
9 
The next obvious question is “three percent of how much?” Deck, Collins and Currington 
(2002) report the results of questionnaires sent to various institutions regarding salary for new 
hires at different levels. The average salaries offered to new hires in the levels of assistant 
professor, associate professor (with tenure) and full professor in the 2001-2002 academic year 
were $62,680, $84,018, and $132,421. Assume that the average salary of a professor that still 
publishes on a regular basis is $90,000, that he has 30 more years to receive salary, and that his 
annual discount rate is 6 percent. A publication in level 1, 2 and 3 then increases annual salary by 
$2700, $1530 and $630; the present values of the life-time increase in earnings are $37,165, 
$21,060 and $8,672.  
4.2  Private Costs of Submissions  
What are the costs to submit an existing manuscript to a journal? These costs have three 
main parts: the time required for printing and mailing the manuscript, the submission fee, and the 
monetary value of the time lost in the refereeing process. With today’s technology, printing three 
or four copies of the manuscript, writing a cover letter and mailing them can be done in half an 
hour. The marginal cost of time for different authors is different, but if we assume that it is $50 
per hour, the time costs of printing and mailing are about $25. 
                                                 
9 Similarly, Price and Razzolini (2002) estimate wage equations from censored salary data generated by grant 
applications submitted to the National Science Foundation Economics Program. A publication in the top six 
economics journals increases salary by 0.5 – 3.6% (in the various specifications), and a publication in any 
economics journal increases salary by 0.2 – 0.5%. 
 13 
What are the submission fees to journals today? Those differ significantly between 
journals, even when comparing journals at about the same level. Table 1 presents data about 
submission fees in different journals. Since many journals give a discount to members of the 
relevant association or to subscribers of the journal, I present data on membership / subscription 
fees as well. The data is taken from the websites of the journals or from recent issues of the 
journal. As can be seen in the table, submission fees in the economics journals in the sample are 
at most $100 for subscribers and $175 for non-subscribers. The comparison with the related 
fields of accounting and finance is interesting, since journals in these two fields charge much 
higher submission fees.  
The value of time lost in the refereeing process (from the author’s perspective) depends 
on the FRT. Not many journals provide this important information; going over dozens of 
journals, however, I found a few journals that do. In addition, Ellison (2002a) provides 
information about the QJE and the JPE. Table 2 presents the FRT in these journals, ranked 
according to the median FRT for new submissions (the mean when the median is unavailable). 
The average of the mean FRT in the top five journals (AER, Econometrica, JPE, QJE, and 
REStud) is 126 days (taking in the QJE the number for all papers), or about four months, and in 
the other economics journals the number is similar. I present data about the FRT in finance and 
accounting journals because the comparison to economics journals raises the puzzle why the 
difference is so big (this is a good topic for future research). Taking four months as the average 
FRT, the monetary cost of the editorial delay is about one third of the annual increase in salary 
following publication. Taking again a salary of $90,000, this is about $900, $510 and $210 for 
articles that are eventually published in journals of level 1, 2 and 3. It follows that the editorial 
delay is the major submission cost in economics journals.  14 
4.3  Social Cost of Submissions 
  The social cost of a submission is mainly due to the time editors and referees spend on 
the paper. Usually a paper is sent to two referees. As was mentioned earlier, Hamermesh (1994) 
estimates that it takes six hours to referee an average paper, while the Canadian Journal of 
Economics notes that it may take between two hours and two full days, and estimates it on 
average to be three to four hours. Averaging the two estimates, I assume that it takes each referee 
five hours of work to read the paper and write the report.  
  I did not find any source that estimates the time it takes editors to handle a paper. The 
editor has to get an idea what the paper is about, find appropriate referees and send them the 
paper, evaluate their reports, and make a decision about the paper. When the decision is “revise 
and resubmit,” the editor may want to make clear which of the referees’ comments he deems 
important. In the absence of a better number, I will assume that it takes the editor about an hour 
to handle an average paper until the first editorial decision is mailed to the authors. There are 
also overhead costs of the journal; some of these costs, however, such as the printing and 
circulation of the journal, are caused by the publication of accepted articles and not by the 
refereeing process. Again, it is hard to come up with a good number for the overhead costs; I will 
assume it is around $50 per manuscript submitted, on average.  
  The next question is how much the time of the referees and the editor is worth. I will 
stick to the previous number of $50 per hour. This is for example the average salary per hour of a 
professor who is paid $90,000 for nine months and works 200 hours a month. Multiplying 11 
hours by $50 and adding the overhead costs suggest that handling a submission has opportunity 
costs of about $600.  15 
4.4  Social Benefits From a Shorter First Response Time 
  The benefit from reducing the editorial delay is that it enables to disseminate research 
faster. This is particularly important since new research uses previous results, so any delay also 
defers subsequent research. Today, with the availability of working papers on the Internet, some 
argue that the role of journals in disseminating information is reduced. While this is probably 
true, I do not think that it is reduced to zero. The reason is that publication in a good journal is a 
signal that the article is of high quality, and a signal about quality is very important information, 
as it allows readers to avoid reading low-quality research.  
  It will be too heroic to try to come up with monetary social values for different editorial 
delays. We have to remember, however, that the FRT is only one part of the delay between a 
finished manuscript and its publication. This delay also includes the time it takes to revise the 
paper, to re-evaluate the revised version (these two steps may occur more than once, especially 
in top journals; see Ellison 2002a; 2002b), and the time between acceptance of the paper and its 
publication.
10  
  Ellison (2002a) reports that in the top five general-interest journals the average submit-
accept time was 21.9 months in 1999. In other general-interest journals and field journals it was 
16.7 and 15.3 months, respectively. Trivedi (1993) provides information about the time from 
acceptance to publication, which was 9.4 months on average in his sample. Therefore, a paper 
                                                 
10 The time to evaluate the revised paper depends on the editor and sometimes also on the referees (when the editor 
asks for their advice on the revised paper). This time should be as short as possible; the cost of delaying the 
dissemination of new research still exists at this point, but the benefit of deterring excessive submissions by means 
of editorial delay does not, because these submissions are of papers that the editor does in fact want to publish.  16 
that appears in a top-five journal takes about 31 months from submission to publication, while in 
lower-quality journals it takes about 6 months less. 
  Shortening the FRT from four to two months, for example, will therefore shorten the total 
delay by only 6.5 percent in a top-five journal and by 8 percent in other journals when the delay 
is computed in the publishing journal only. The FRT is more important, however, if we take into 
account that papers may be rejected a few times prior to publication. For example, if papers are 
rejected on average twice before they are accepted, and the author submits the paper to the next 
journal immediately after receiving a rejection (which is optimal, unless the author wants to 
revise the paper significantly), we should add twice the FRT to get the total time from first 
submission to publication. This results in 39 months for a top-five journal and about 33 months 
for other journals. Shortening the FRT from four to two months then shortens the total delay by 
six months, or 15.4 percent for a top-five journal and 18.2 percent for other journals. The effect 
of shortening the FRT by 50 percent is therefore much lower than 50 percent when looking at the 
total delay, even when accounting for the possibility that a paper is submitted to more than one 
journal before it is accepted. 
5.   Optimal Submission Strategy 
  The optimal submission strategy in general is a complicated problem. If there were only 
100 journals, one would have more than 100! (100 factorial) different ways to choose the 
submission list (there are 100! combinations to make an ordered list of 100 journals, plus 
numerous other combinations to submit to less than 100 journals). To solve the problem 
accurately, one needs to know for each journal the benefit from publication, the cost of 
submission, the editorial delay and the acceptance chances, as well as the time until retirement 17 
and the discount rate of the author in order to compute the value of each possible submission 
sequence (see Oster, 1980). The complexity is yet higher if one wants to account for the fact that 
rejections also change the estimates of the acceptance chances in other journals (and the 
information embedded in receiving a rejection is different for the different journals). 
  As a result, I take a simpler approach: I compute costs and benefits of submission 
approximately, to get an idea about who finds it optimal to submit papers to top journals under 
different editorial delays. Doing so is somewhat tricky, because the quality of the paper affects 
its acceptance chances and also its submission cost (through the time cost of the editorial delay, 
as was explained before). So we have to divide the discussion according to where the paper is 
likely to be published eventually, because this affects the submission cost. I assume for 
simplicity that all journals in the same level (according to the division to three levels mentioned 
before) have equal acceptance chances and benefits from publication. 
  Let us consider for a moment only papers that for sure will be published eventually in 
either a level-1 or a level-2 journal. The cost of the editorial delay for the author is somewhere 
between $510 and $900, depending on the probability that the paper will eventually be published 
(potentially after several submissions) in a level-1 journal (the higher this probability is, the 
closer the cost is to $900). The present value of a publication in a level-1 journal is higher than 
that of a level-2 journal by $16,105. Assume that the submission fee is $50. Adding the $25 
printing and mailing time cost, the total submission cost is therefore less than $975. This implies 
that papers with chances of 6.1 percent or more to be accepted by a level-1 journal (in a single 
submission, not the chances of eventual publication after a sequence of submissions) should 
submit to a level-1 journal, because 0.061*$16,105 = $982 > $975. We can go one step further, 
however, by examining the eventual probabilities of publication of a paper with 6.1 percent to be 18 
accepted in a level-1 journal. If such a paper is submitted to all ten level-1 journals sequentially, 
it has a probability of 53 percent (0.939
10) to be rejected from all of them. So the delay cost for 
such a paper is not $900 but rather 0.53*$510 + 0.47*$900 = $693; together with the submission 
fee and mailing costs, the total submission cost is $768. This implies that any paper with chances 
of 4.8 percent ($768/$16,105) or more to be accepted by a level-1 journal should submit to the 
top journals. We can now repeat the process of re-computing the eventual publication chances, 
the delay cost, and so on. The result is that any paper with chances of 4.5 percent to be accepted 
by a level-1 journal should submit to the top journals.  
  We can also perform the same computation from the other side – assume that the delay 
cost is only $510, compute the cut-off probability for submitting to top journals ($585/$16,105 = 
3.6%), re-evaluate the delay cost in light of this probability, and so on. The result is the same cut-
off of 4.5 percent. This is the cut-off for the first submission; as the paper is rejected from level-1 
journals, the cut-off decreases gradually toward 3.7 percent. For example, in the tenth 
submission to a level-1 journal, there are no more level-1 journals left, so the delay cost for a 
paper with 4-percent chances of acceptance to level 1 is 0.96*$510 + 0.04*$900 = $526, 
implying total cost of $601 and a cut-off probability of $601/$16,105 = 3.7 percent. 
  The reader might think that 4.5 percent is a very small chance, and that someone who 
only evaluates his chances of acceptance as 5 or 6 percent probably gives up submission to a top 
journal. But acceptance rates in the top five journals are about 9 percent
11; since the average 
                                                 
11 The AER publishes the acceptance rate in the annual editor’s report, and had 10.3 percent in 2001. For the other 
journals I computed the acceptance rates by dividing the number of articles published in 2001 (according to Journal 
Citation Reports) by the number of annual submissions. Econometrica received 517 new submissions during the 
year 7/1/2000 – 6/30/2001 (see the editor’s report in the January 2002 issue) and published 66 articles (12.8 19 
paper has a probability of 9 percent to be accepted, papers that are below the average quality of 
papers submitted have less than 9 percent chances and yet they are submitted, suggesting that the 
cut-off of 4.5 percent may be a reasonable approximation for the actual behavior of many 
authors.  
5.1  How Do Different Delays and Submission Fees Affect the Cut-off Probability? 
  We can perform the same analysis as in the previous subsection to compute the cut-off 
probability when the delay is changed. For example, if the delay is only two months, the cost of 
the delay is $450 and $255 for papers that are eventually published in level 1 and 2 journals. In 
addition, we can change the submission fee and see how this affects the cut-off probabilities. 
Table 3 reports the cut-off probabilities for different values of the FRT and the submission fee.  
6.  First Response Times and the Number of Submissions 
  If submission fee on average is $50, how do different FRTs affect the behavior of 
authors? Suppose that we could reduce the FRT to only two months. We see from Table 3 that 
the cut-off probability will change from 4.5 percent to 2.3 percent. What does it mean in terms of 
the number of submissions? Since acceptance rates in the top five journals are around 9 percent 
                                                                                                                                                             
percent). The REStud received 419 new submissions during the year 3/2000 – 2/2001 (the data is from the journal’s 
website) and published 36 articles (8.6 percent). The JPE received 608 submissions in 2000 and published 44 
articles (7.2 percent). The QJE received 684 submissions in 1998 and published 42 articles (6.1 percent). The 
number of submissions to the JPE and the QJE appears in a graph in Ellison (2002a); I thank Glenn Ellison for 
providing me the exact numbers. 20 
and in the next five around 16 percent, it probably means many more submissions.
12 The reason 
is that the distribution of the quality of papers is very skewed. Consider a typical top-five journal 
with a 9-percent acceptance rate and 630 submissions (this is approximately the average number 
of submissions in the top five journals). Suppose that the articles that were in fact accepted for 
publication had ex-ante acceptance chances of 40 percent. These articles constitute 9 percent of 
the submissions. Since the average (over all papers) ex-ante acceptance chances are 9 percent 
(the acceptance rate of the journal), the average ex-ante acceptance chances for the rest of the 
submissions (denoted by p) must satisfy 0.09*0.4 + 0.91*p = 0.09, so p = 0.059. That is, the 
average ex-ante acceptance probability of almost 600 papers that were not accepted eventually is 
5.9 percent.  
  If the distribution of acceptance chances of rejected papers is symmetric, there are about 
300 submissions with ex-ante acceptance rates below 5.9 percent, and above 4.5 percent (the cut-
off probability). If it is not symmetric, as is more likely, there are many more than 300 
submissions with ex-ante acceptance probability of 4.5−5.9 percent. For example, we assumed 
that the papers accepted had a 40 percent ex-ante probability. This implies that there are many 
more papers with similar probability that were rejected. For every 40-percent-chance paper that 
                                                 
12 The five journals that are included in level 1 in Moore, Newman and Turnbull (2001) and not in the top five 
mentioned before are REStat, EJ, JET, Economica and IER. I could not obtain recent data about acceptance rates in 
these journals, but Miller and Punsalan (1988) report the following acceptance rates from about 15 years ago: 
REStat – 15%, EJ – 15%, JET – does not appear, Economica – 16%, IER – 20%, implying 16.5% on average. To 
judge according to the top five journals, acceptance rates today may be slightly smaller; the average of the top five 
in Miller and Punsalan is 10.6% (the breakdown is: AER – 13%, Econometrica – 8%, JPE – 11-20%, QJE – 8-9%, 
REStud – 8.2%). 21 
was rejected there have to be about 24 papers with a 4.5-percent acceptance probability to keep 
the average of 5.9 percent for rejected papers. 
  It is only reasonable then that there are several hundreds of papers with ex-ante 
acceptance probability of 2.3−4.5 percent that were not submitted when the delay was four 
months, but will be submitted with a two-months delay. For example, if the density of papers 
with quality such that they have acceptance chances of 2.3−4.5 percent is the same as in the 
range of 4.5−5.9 percent, and if 400 submissions have acceptance chances of 4.5-5.9 percent, 
then shortening the delay to two months will result in 400*(4.5−2.3)/(5.9−4.5) = 629 more 
submissions to each journal! If the distribution of paper quality is skewed with higher density in 
the lower end, as is more likely, the increase in the number of submissions can be much higher.  
  I do not claim that the computations performed represent accurately the behavior of 
authors or the conditions in the market for journal publications. I had to ignore certain aspects of 
the real world for the analysis to be traceable (as is usually the case in economics). In some cases 
the absence of data (about the opportunity cost of time, the distribution of quality of papers and 
so on) required me to provide some reasonable guess and discuss it. But I believe that the 
important points that the analysis makes are valid, and changing the assumptions to other 
reasonable assumptions will not change these results significantly: first, given the nominal 
submission fees, the editorial delay is the major cost of submission (this result is even stronger if 
we consider the case of untenured faculty). Second, the small chances of acceptance in top 
journals together with the high submission cost (because of the editorial delay) bring many 
authors of mediocre papers to give up the idea to submit to top journals. Reducing the delay will 
reduce the cost of submission and cause many additional submissions of papers that were not 
submitted to top journals before. The same thing will happen to lower-quality papers that today 22 
are submitted to level-3 journals, but will be submitted to level-2 journals if the delay becomes 
significantly shorter. 
7.  Are First Response Times Shorter Than Optimal? 
  The costs of a shorter FRT are the increased number of submissions and the resources 
(mainly time of referees and editors) needed to handle them. If the FRT is reduced by a half, 
each top journal will receive hundreds of additional submissions that previously were not 
submitted to it, and level-2 journals will receive submissions that were previously targeted at 
lower-quality journals. The total number of additional submissions handled by all journals can 
easily be several thousands each year and even more. If the social cost of handling each 
submission is about $600, reducing the editorial delay from four to two months is likely to cost a 
few millions of dollars per year. Is this a reasonable price to pay for reducing the FRT by two 
months, and the total publication delay by a few months (depending on how many times we 
think papers are rejected before being accepted)? I leave this judgment to the reader. It is hard to 
compare money to delay, however. It might be easier to judge if we first translate the money 
amount to additional positions for economics professors. If the cost of employing an average 
professor is $120,000 (salary + benefits + cost of office and so on), then 200 additional 
submissions are equivalent to the cost of an additional professor. If we think that shortening the 
FRT will result in 8,000 additional submissions each year, the choice is between reducing the 
FRT and 40 economics professors.  
  There are additional important points in favor of a high FRT, however. Since a reduced 
FRT will increase the number of submissions to top journals, acceptance rates will drop and 
papers will suffer more rejections before they are published. The time they spend being rejected 23 
from journals increases the total publication delay and may offset and even exceed the time 
saved by shortening the FRT. As a result, we may not only increase the workload of referees and 
editors, but also increase the total time that a paper spends from its initial submission to its 
publication. Moreover, the increased number of submissions is likely to lead journals to use less 
qualified referees, and referees to spend less time reviewing each submission, both reducing the 
quality of the refereeing process.  
  Of course, there are many other issues involved. If referees give helpful comments also to 
rejected papers and if authors revise their papers accordingly, the social cost of the refereeing 
process may be lower than was computed before. On the other hand, maybe shortening the delay 
will induce authors to submit their papers in an earlier stage and with a lower quality than they 
do today. If authors know very little about the quality of their papers and referees are very 
accurate in their evaluation, inducing more people to submit to top journals will increase the 
quality of top journals (some cases in which good papers are not submitted to top journals will be 
eliminated), improving the matching between article and journal qualities. If authors have good 
idea about the quality of their papers and referees make some mistakes, however, more 
submissions of low-quality papers (induced by a shorter FRT) can actually reduce the average 
quality of top journals and hurt the sorting function of journals.  
  Overall, I think that with the existing submission fees, shortening the FRT may not be 
beneficial because of its effect on the submission cost and the number of submissions. I 
discussed the example of shortening the FRT to two months, but similar analysis with similar 
results can be performed on different FRT-targets. We can also ask the question whether we may 
need to increase the FRT. Increasing it to six months, for example, will raise the cut-off 
probability to 7.1 percent (only authors who think their papers have at least 7.1 percent 24 
acceptance chances in a top journal will submit to such journals) compared to a cut-off of 4.5 
percent with the current FRT of four months. This will reduce significantly the number of papers 
submitted to the top journals. Similarly, papers that are sent to level-2 journals but have only 
small acceptance chances may now be sent directly to level-3 journals, reducing the number of 
submissions again. Since the submissions that will be eliminated are those of authors who think 
they have very small acceptance chances, the number of good papers that will not be submitted 
to top journals is likely to be very small. Also, the reduced number of submissions will increase 
acceptance rates and reduce the average number of times papers are rejected prior to publication, 
offsetting some, and maybe all, of the increase in the delay from first submission to publication. 
Even if the effect of the higher FRT is not completely offset by the decrease in rejections, 
however, the significant reduction in the workload of referees and editors may justify the small 
increase in publication delay. This implies that the current FRT may be smaller than optimal, and 
the efforts to reduce the FRT may be efforts in the wrong direction.  
  A conclusion that a market in equilibrium is not efficient usually requires additional 
explanation. In the case of the review process, however, prices do not reflect marginal costs and 
many prices are missing altogether, and authors, editors and referees impose externalities on 
each other and on readers. Submission fees are much lower than the social cost of submission, 
the rewards to publication are not equal to the social benefit, and referees are rarely compensated 
for their work, to name a few examples. It is therefore not surprising that the market may not be 
efficient. One particular reason that might lead to the FRT being less than optimal is the 
competition between journals. If all top journals increase the FRT, then most of the papers that 
will no longer be submitted to top journals are those that were rejected anyway. But if only one 
top journal increases its FRT, it is likely to lose good papers to the competing top journals. While 25 
the increased FRT will reduce the workload of the editors and referees of the journal, it will also 
reduce the quality of the papers published, and therefore editors are not likely to take such action.  
8.  What about Untenured Faculty? 
  Another interesting point is about the interests of untenured faculty. Since they have a 
ticking tenure clock over their heads, it seems intuitive that they want the FRT to be as short as 
possible, so that they can have more publications before the tenure decision is made. This 
intuition is wrong, however. First, the number of articles that appear in top journals does not 
change as a result of a change in the FRT, so it cannot be that everyone will publish more. What 
may happen is that untenured faculty will be able to afford more trials in top journals before they 
refer to lower-quality outlets, and therefore a shorter FRT may be beneficial for their publication 
records (at the expense of tenured faculty, since it is a zero-sum game – tenured and untenured 
faculty compete for a fixed number of top-journal articles). The benefit is not going to be high, 
however, because the higher number of submissions to top journals will reduce the acceptance 
rate, increasing the average number of submissions prior to acceptance, and therefore offsetting 
some, or all, of the shorter publication delay due to the shorter FRT.  
  Even if a shorter FRT increases the number of top-journal articles published by untenured 
faculty, however, it does not help them to get tenure. The reason is that untenured professors 
compete among themselves. The decision how many publications and in which journals are good 
enough to get tenure is not a decision made in heaven. If assistant professors will be able to 
publish more than they do today, the number of publications required for tenure will increase as 
well (see Pressman, 1994). So even though untenured professors may have more publications by 
the time they are up for tenure, their relative ranking may not change, and this ranking is what 26 
determines who gets tenure where. Even if the ranking will change from some reason, for every 
winner there will also be a loser; obviously, not all untenured professors can improve their 
relative ranking compared to others in the same group.  
  Another reason that untenured faculty will not benefit from a shorter FRT is that it will 
increase their refereeing workload. Editors are limited in their use of experienced and well-
known economists as referees, and will respond to an increase in submissions by asking younger 
economists to serve as referees more often (especially given that the additional submissions will 
be of relatively low-quality papers). After all, untenured professors have the most interest to 
retain the editor’s good will (in case the editor is asked to write a letter on them when they are up 
for tenure, for example), so they are the least likely to refuse to referee a paper.  
9. Conclusion 
  After discussing briefly why it is important to do research on the academic publishing 
process, I focused on one aspect of the process – the FRT. In light of recent efforts by editors of 
various journals to reduce the FRT, I examine whether doing so is socially beneficial. I argue 
that given the small costs of submitting an existing manuscript to a journal, the editorial delay 
constitutes the major submission cost. Since the rewards to publication in top journals are very 
high, a reduction in the editorial delay and therefore in the submission cost will induce many 
more submissions of lower-quality papers to top journals. This has large costs in terms of the 
additional time that editors and referees will have to invest to handle these papers. Moreover, an 
increase in submissions will increase the rejection rate and the average number of times that a 
paper is rejected before being published. As a result, the total time from the submission to the 27 
first journal till publication (potentially in a different journal) may not decrease much and may 
even increase.  
  The conclusion is that given the submission fees that economics journals charge today, 
the efforts of editors to reduce the FRT, while promoting the interest of the journal to attract 
authors, may be socially undesirable. In fact, it may be that even the current FRT (about four 
months) is shorter than optimal. I also explain why even untenured faculty will not benefit from 
a reduction in the editorial delay.  
  I started by saying that research on the academic publishing process is important, and I 
will end by suggesting a few ideas for future research. Some ideas are policy oriented. One such 
idea is to examine the optimal mix of submission fees and editorial delays. Can we reduce the 
FRT and prevent excessive submissions by charging a high submission fee? Also interesting is 
how much time the referees should invest in suggesting improvements to a paper they 
recommend to reject. On one hand, the comments may be helpful because the paper is likely to 
be published eventually (in another journal) and if the author revises it to include the referees’ 
comments, the paper presumably will be better (see Laband, 1990 on the added value of referees’ 
comments).
13 Since the referee reads the paper anyway, it seems a waste not to let the author 
know how the paper can be improved (although it takes some time to come up with specific 
                                                 
13 While most authors are rational enough to incorporate referees’ comments at least when they receive an invitation 
to resubmit the paper, not everyone thinks this really improves the paper. Paul Samuelson, for example, says 
(Shepherd, 1995, p. 20): “I have learned from experience not to argue with or ignore referees’ comments and 
criticisms; but in my heart of hearts I question that, net, they have improved the merits of my papers’ contents or 
expositions.” It should be noted, however, that even if referees’ comments did not improve Samuelson’s papers, 
they might still improve the papers written by the rest of us… 28 
ideas and write them down clearly). On the other hand, if rejected papers receive very helpful 
feedback from referees, this may encourage authors of bad papers or papers that are not yet ready 
for publication to submit their papers to journals just to get some helpful feedback.  
  Another line of research is to explore empirically the review process. Knowing more 
about the process is essential in order to make better decisions about if and how it should be 
changed. How many times is a paper rejected on average before being accepted? What portion of 
the editorial delay is caused by referees and what portion by editors?
14 How much time does it 
take referees to review a paper and write the referee report? Do more experienced scholars write 
better reports, or maybe since they are busy they write less helpful reports? To what extent do 
authors revise a rejected paper according to the referee’s report before sending it to another 
journal? How similar are the reports by different referees on the same paper? Compared to the 
importance of the subject, so little work was done that the opportunities for future research are 
abundant. Such research can suggest changes that will improve the way the academic system is 
managed, increasing the productivity of professors and the contribution of the academic world to 
society. 
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Table 1    








Submission fee – 
others 
(4) 





(2) + (4); this is 
an alternative fee 
to (3) 
Economics Journals      
AER  $75  $150  $61 - $86   $136 - $161 
Canadian J. Econ.  $25 $65
  $40 $65 
Econometrica  $0 $0 $59  $59 
Economica  $0 $40
  $40 $40 
Economic Inquiry  $100
  $160 $60  $160 
Intl. Econ. Review  $55 $120  $66 $121 
J. Econ. Theory  $0 $0 $95  $95 
J. Labor Econ.  $0 $0 $52  $52 
J. Math. Econ.  $0 $0 $115  $115 
J. Monetary Econ.  $100
  $175
  $95 $195 
JPE  $50 $50 $50 $100 
QJE  $0 $0 $44  $44 
RAND J. Econ  $50 $85 $60 $110 
REStat  $0  $50 $53 $53 
REStud  $0 $0 $54  $54 
Southern Econ. J.  $50 $75 $50 $100 
Accounting Journals      
The Accounting Rev.  $75 $100  $85 $160 
J. Acc. & Econ.  $250
  $300
  $70 $320 
J. Accounting Res.  $200 $200 $99  $299 
Finance Journals      
J. Finance  $70 $140  $80 $150 
J. Financial Econ.  $400
  $450
  $95 $495 
Rev. Financial Stud.  $125
  $175
  $45 $170 
The data was taken from the journals' websites in 2003. 33 
Table 2  
First Response Times (FRT) in Various Journals (in Days) 




Period  Source / journal 
issue 
Comments 
Economics Journals         
Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 
NA  47  1997  Ellison (2002a).  All papers.  
    114      Accepted papers only. 
    82      Papers sent to referees. 
Canadian Journal of 
Economics 





Journal of Economic History  103 108 2000/2001  September  2001.  Including  re-submissions. 
Southern Economic Journal  107  122  2001  October 2002.  New submissions only.  
American Economic Review  109 122 7/1/00-
6/30/01 
May 2002.  Rejected papers only. 
Econometrica  110 122 2000  January  2002.  New  submissions  only. 
  98 92     Revisions  only. 
  108 122     All  papers. 
Economic Journal  137 137 2000  RES  Newsletter 
(Jan 2003). 
All papers. 
  137 125     Letters  advising  rejection. 
  168 188     Letters  inviting  revision. 
European Economic Review  143 165 2000  May  2002.   
The RAND Journal of 
Economics 
153  131  2000  Summer 2002.  Simple average of the 
four quarters of the year. 
Economic Inquiry  NA 159 1/1/02-
4/15/02 
October 2002.   
Journal of Political Economy  NA 167 2000  Ellison  (2002a).   




New submissions only. 
  194 198     First  revision. 
  159 138     Second  revision. 
Accounting Journals         
The Accounting Review  51 52 3/1/01-
2/28/02 
July 2002.  Including re-submissions. 
Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 
52 53 12  months 
ending 
4/2002 
August 2002.   
Finance Journals         













Additional details about the computations performed (in those cases that the journals publish the 
distribution rather than the mean or median) can be obtained from the author upon request. 34 
Table 3   































0.04  0.2% 0.5% 0.8% 1.1% 1.4% 1.7% 2.1% 2.4% 2.7% 
1  1.0% 1.3% 1.7% 2.0% 2.3% 2.6% 3.0% 3.3% 3.6% 
2  2.0% 2.3% 2.6% 3.0% 3.3% 3.7% 4.0% 4.3% 4.7% 
3  3.0% 3.4% 3.7% 4.1% 4.4% 4.8% 5.1% 5.5% 5.8% 
4  4.2% 4.5% 4.9% 5.3% 5.6% 6.0% 6.3% 6.7% 7.1% 
5  5.4% 5.8% 6.2% 6.5% 6.9% 7.3% 7.6% 8.0% 8.4% 
6  6.7% 7.1% 7.5% 7.9% 8.2% 8.6% 9.0% 9.3% 9.7% 
8  9.6%  9.9% 10.3% 10.7% 11.1% 11.4% 11.8% 12.2% 12.5% 
10  12.5% 12.9% 13.3% 13.7% 14.0% 14.4% 14.8% 15.1% 15.5% 
12  15.6% 16.0% 16.3% 16.7% 17.0% 17.4% 17.8% 18.1% 18.5% 
 